



Can the Global South Improve the Humanitarian Aid System? Comparing North-South Aid and South-South Cooperation in Haiti

Alessandra Rosa Policarpo
Macalester College

Alessandra Rosa Policarpo is a first-generation college student from Brazil, pursuing a double major in economics and political science and a minor in Latin American studies at Macalester College. Alessandra's professional and academic experiences span four countries, which gives her a unique perspective on, and a strong interest in, exploring the inequalities among countries in the international sphere. This interest led her to explore the field of humanitarianism and the asymmetric relations between donor countries and aid-recipient countries, culminating in "Can the Global South Improve the Humanitarian Aid System? Comparing North-South Aid and South-South Cooperation in Haiti," which was her senior thesis. Alessandra would like to give special thanks to Professors Paul Dosh and Lisa Mueller for their mentorship and encouragement during the development of this research project.

Abstract

Humanitarianism, despite its goal of equality and alleviating suffering, often perpetuates colonial systems, serving Western political agendas in the Global South. Haiti's post-2010 earthquake aid exemplifies this failure, with billions of dollars in aid yielding limited improvements in the lives of the affected population. Analyzing the aftermath of the 2010 earthquake in Haiti, I argue that Global South countries can bring change to the humanitarian system by treating the recipient countries with more respect, paying official visits to the country in need, and exporting knowledge that has worked in their countries to mitigate poverty, hunger, and violence. However, Global South aid is less effective when Global South economies rely on the same systems that Global North countries have historically used, because it damages partnerships and trust. I investigate the respective relationships of the United States and Brazil with Haiti through historical case analysis. First, I conduct an analysis of aid pledges and funding from both the United States and Brazil to Haiti in the aftermath of the 2010 earthquake. Then I examine the work of two NGOs from Brazil and one from the United States. Finally, I conduct semi-structured interviews with a community organizer in Haiti and a Senior Research Associate at CEPR about aid accountability and transparency.

1. Introduction

According to the UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees), humanitarianism recognizes every human as equal and has the main mission of “saving lives and alleviating suffering” (UNHCR, 2023). Although the intentions of the aid provider can be good, humanitarianism has a long history of reproducing colonial systems and being used as a tool to advance Western countries’ political agendas in the Global South. For example, after the Rwandan genocide, it became clear to the international community that aid can have unintended consequences and sometimes does more harm than good (Terry, 2002). This realization leads us to analyze the relationship between providers and recipients of aid and to consider whether there are some cases in which the aid proves more effective.

The rise of Global South countries’ economies reflects their skepticism about the prevailing humanitarian framework dominated by the Northern donors. This skepticism has empowered these nations to assert influence over potential humanitarian aid endeavors. Extensive literature examining the Global South within the global humanitarian aid system reveals a spectrum of views on Global South nations’ contributions. Some scholars identify various challenges Global South countries face in distributing aid and distinguishing themselves from their Global North counterparts, while others highlight Global South’s positive role in decolonizing the humanitarian aid system. Nonetheless, amidst these mixed perspectives, the Global South actively engages in robust discussions on the efficacy of humanitarian assistance, critically questioning established beliefs and terminologies which contribute to a constructive reshaping of the humanitarian aid landscape.

I am interested, therefore, in investigating further the role that Global South countries play in shaping the humanitarian system, and in whether their aid could be considered more effective than Global North countries’ aid when the country in need is from the Global South. I will compare one major donor from the Global North, the United States, and one donor from the Global South, Brazil, in their respective responses to the earthquake in Haiti in 2010, in order to answer the research question: “Can the Global South Improve the Humanitarian Aid System?” My findings show that Global South countries can deliver more effective aid as long as they operate through Global South systems of partnership and cooperation and do not operate within the colonial hierarchies previously set by Global North countries.

2. Global South Countries in the Humanitarian Aid System

North-South Aid (NSA), referring to Global North countries providing assistance to Global South countries, has faced growing criticism. This criticism stems from concerns about Global North countries fostering resource dependency in developing nations (Appe, 2018), attaching specific economic and political

conditions to aid, and recipients lacking positive results despite substantial assistance (Meibo, 2014). In response to these concerns, and alongside the rise of Global South economies in the last few decades, these nations are now playing an increasingly active role in contributing to the global aid system. For instance, the United Arab Emirates' (UAE's) contribution to aid surpasses the average contribution from OECD (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development) countries; and relative to its GDP (Gross Domestic Product), the UAE is the top donor in the world (Cochrane, 2021). Global South countries aiding other Global South countries is called South-South Cooperation, which is "the mutual sharing and exchange of development solutions—knowledge, experience, good practices, policies, technology, and resources—between and among countries in the Global South" (Appe, 2018, p. 272).

South-South Cooperation has increased over the past decade mainly due to the economic growth and stability of some countries in the Global South, such as Brazil, China, India, and South Africa, and due to the reduction of aid from the Global North countries after the 2008 financial crisis (Abdenur and Da Fonseca, 2013). Southern donors refer to themselves as partners and adopt a discourse "based on solidarity, complementarity, and horizontality" (Abdenur and Da Fonseca, 2013, p. 1477). This is in contrast with the Northern countries, and seeks to overcome the donor/recipient dichotomy.

Global South countries did not only bring change to the humanitarian system by introducing new terms, but, in fact, Northern and Southern countries have different conceptions of humanitarianism, starting from its principles. Global South countries understand the prevailing humanitarian principles as referring to the Paris Declaration for aid effectiveness, which they see as an imposition from Western countries (Binder and Meier, 2011). Nevertheless, Southern countries still use the traditional humanitarianism principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality, and independence (UNHCR, 2023) mixing them with principles of South-South cooperation and sometimes even religious norms (Binder and Meier, 2011). Northern countries should not fear or assume that Southern countries will completely disregard the humanitarian principles built throughout the decades. Rather, the Global South's questioning of traditional principles opens the debate that could lead to reaching a consensus on principles that both Global South and North countries can agree on.

In the Arab world, the UAE is a significant donor of humanitarian aid. The UAE is also the first country in the Arabian Peninsula to submit complete data of its humanitarian assistance to the OECD since 2009, followed by Kuwait in 2010 and Saudi Arabia in 2015. Even though the UAE started giving aid mostly in a bilateral manner to Arab countries, following the principle of Arab solidarity, today most recipients of its aid are countries in Africa and Asia. The UAE's aid approach differs from the Western tradition, offering non-restricted cash grants and injections to central banks. However, like Northern countries, the UAE also directs its aid on the basis of economic, political, and humanitarian

motivations. Analyzing three primary recipients of Emirati aid (Egypt, Serbia, and Yemen), Logan Cochrane (2021) concluded that general budgetary support is a primary component of the UAE's aid. A Global South country with expressive donations and transparent data is crucial in order for the Southern countries to be recognized as relevant actors in the global aid system.

Global South countries, however, cannot be grouped into one single category, as they have distinct foreign policy orientations and national agendas (Quadir, 2013). In analyzing Brazil, China, India, and South Africa's aid programs, Quadir (2013) argues that almost all Southern donors did not coordinate aid well and lacked a well-functioning centralized body to collect data on their contributions to other countries' development, which is a shortcoming of the Global South's approach compared to the Global North's. The author also showed that each donor has different conceptualizations of development and pays little attention to the values promoted by the West, such as human rights and democracy, but respects the principle of non-domestic interference. Stacey White (2014) also finds that Global South donors prioritize regional response and have consistently prioritized contributions to aid directed for natural disasters rather than complex emergencies, both of which can be explained by their central pillar of respecting other countries' sovereignty. Food assistance is also one of the main contributions Global South donors offer. For instance, Brazil supports other countries by implementing its "zero hunger" program, which successfully mitigates hunger in Brazil (Binder and Meier, 2011).

Besides the lack of coordination among Global South countries, another obstacle to their impact on the humanitarian aid system is the reluctance of world organizations, governments, and international institutions to recognize knowledge from the South. A recent example of this unwillingness happened when Madagascar's president sent Covid-Organics, an herbal medicine developed by Madagascar's state-owned Malagasy Institute of Applied Research, to Tanzania and other African countries to test it. Western countries and the World Health Organization were unwilling to legitimize the medicine, and were even reluctant to test it, claiming that the Tanzanian government was irresponsible for not buying vaccines and instead using Covid-Organics (Richey et al., 2021). By the time the article was published, the Tanzanian government had not received any COVID-19 vaccine, but more recent news reports stated that the government accepted the first COVID-19 vaccine batch in the same year (Vuzo, 2021). While most literature on South-South Cooperation focuses on more significant donors, such as India, China, and Brazil, African countries also contribute to the humanitarian system. Even though the medicine failed to prevent the surge of COVID cases in Tanzania, it renewed interest in African herbal medicine research and invoked the possibility of a Pan-African alternative (Richey et al., 2021).

Even though the Southern states are increasing their participation in the

global aid system, some estimates suggest that their contribution accounts for only 10 percent of the global aid (Quadir, 2013). According to Quadir, Southern states' dual role of recipients and donors may negatively influence their ability to impact the global aid system; this opinion differs from Susan Appe's argument that this dual role may strengthen the Southern countries' ability to distribute aid horizontally. Quadir is also critical of Southern countries' intentions in providing aid, describing them as not very different from the Northern countries (promoting their trade, investment, and commercial interests). The author illustrates this argument by mentioning China's interest in Africa and Brazil's foreign policy interest in pursuing a seat on the United Nations Security Council. He affirms that if Southern donors fail to increase their aid volume, they will likely be unable to change the current aid system. Meibo (2014) also expresses his preoccupation with Southern governments' internal struggles with poverty and weak institutions, which prevent them from being more dominant in the global aid system.

The literature suggests that the humanitarian aid system has changed with the recent insertion of Global South countries as significant donors. The main contribution of the emerging donors is the change in the discourse regarding humanitarian assistance, which historically has regarded such aid as a hierarchical and top-down relationship between Global North and Global South countries. "Cooperation" and "Partnership" are some of the new words introduced from the aid lexicon of South-South Cooperation. In general, the Global South donors also respect the traditional humanitarian principles, paying more attention to some than to others and adding principles of South-South cooperation (for instance, great weight is placed on sovereignty). The main concerns about Global South donors are a lack of transparency about their assistance and a lack of a unified framework to guide their actions, as each Global South donor follows its own foreign policy and national interests. Quadir (2014) and Meibo (2014) also mentioned internal struggles, such as fighting hunger and inequality, as reasons why Global-South donors cannot be more influential in the global architecture of aid, while for Appe (2018), acting as both givers and recipients of aid is one of the Global South's strongest advantages as compared to the Global North countries. Although some authors have attempted to answer whether the Global South's aid could be more effective than the Global North's, the answer can depend on the specific donor country analyzed and on which standards were considered for evaluation. Therefore, considering the diverging opinions and findings on Global-South countries' contributions to humanitarian aid, the research question proposed is relevant and can contribute to the ongoing literature.

3. Methodology and Research Design

In order to answer my research question, I will focus on aid support to Haiti after the 2010 earthquake from Brazil, one of the largest Southern donors, and contrast it with the aid provided by the United States, a Global North country. Brazil and the United States are close geographically to Haiti, and both assisted the country after the natural disaster, constituting a good example of cooperation among Global South and North donors in the Caribbean. I chose Haiti, and specifically the earthquake in 2010, because that provided the opportunity to analyze the long-term impact of foreign assistance.

My primary hypothesis is that aid effectiveness is more likely to increase when both the donor and the recipient countries are from the Global South. This is because they view each other as partners and can draw upon shared experiences in addressing poverty and other socio-economic challenges. I will test my hypothesis by collecting data to assess the causal process through historical case analysis. I first analyze the responses from the Brazilian and the U.S. governments after the earthquake. Then, I examine the work of three NGOs (Non-Governmental Organizations): one from the United States (the American Red Cross), and two from Brazil (*Viva Rio* and *MST* [Brazil's Landless Workers Movement]). I chose the American Red Cross because it was the largest U.S. NGO operating in Haiti, and because of its successful fundraising of almost half a billion dollars. In addition, the organization is part of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, a system that comprises 187 Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC). Although each Red Cross Organization is unique, they operate under the same principles, and therefore, the findings derived from the analysis may hold broader implications for other humanitarian emergencies where the Red Cross is actively involved.

The organization Viva Rio was chosen because it was the biggest Brazilian organization involved in post-2010 earthquake operations in Haiti. Furthermore, it had substantial ties to the Global North, being funded by Global North countries and appointed by the United Nations to aid Haiti with the military operation MINUSTAH (*Mission des Nations Unies pour la stabilisation en Haiti*, The United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti). By contrast, the MST represents a grassroots movement from Brazil, and is largely untouched by the Global North. The inclusion of these different organizations from the Global South, both in terms of funding sources and relationships with the Global North, therefore, adds depth to my study, enhancing the robustness of the findings. The analysis of the three organizations will consist of reading the public information available on NGOs' websites and scholarly articles evaluating their humanitarian efforts.

In addition, I interviewed Jake Johnston, a senior researcher at the Center of Economic Policy and Research (CEPR), and Etain Dupain, a Haitian community organizer. Johnston was the lead author of CEPR's Haiti Relief & Reconstruction Watch after the earthquake in 2010, which tracked aid flows

coming into Haiti and demanded transparency and accountability from foreign organizations. Dupain also demanded aid accountability, being the director of the Creole independent media collective *Bri Kouri Nouvèl Gaye* back in 2010, and worked on the award-winning film *Haiti: Where Did the Money Go?* (Mitchell, 2012).

4. Aid Effectiveness

Why is aid effectiveness important? Aid organizations have larger budgets than ever to conduct their humanitarian operations, yet there is no sign that global humanitarian emergencies are decreasing in numbers or intensity. According to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), funding worldwide for humanitarian aid operations reached \$29.7 billion in 2022, compared with \$15.3 billion in 2018. Yet, the amount spent in 2022 only covered 57.5 percent of people's humanitarian aid needs (Global Humanitarian Overview, 2022). Even though the amount of funding is relevant, one may ask if the money is put to optimal use, saving as many lives as possible.

Traditionally, aid effectiveness has been measured by reductions in mortality and morbidity. However, realizing that aid can also negatively affect the population it aims to help has led to broader inquiries beyond technical performance, such as questioning the relationship between donor governments and aid recipients (De Torrenté, 2013). There is no consensus amongst scholars, governments, and aid organizations on what characterizes effective aid. The Paris Convention of 2005 was the first time donors and partner countries agreed to measure the impact of their assistance. The Convention proposed five principles to maximize aid effectiveness: *ownership, alignment, harmonization, results-based management, and mutual accountability*. However, even though those principles have been recognized as a global norm by OECD/DAC (Development Assistance Committee) members, Global South countries recognize them as only partially legitimate because the emerging donors' perspectives were not properly included in the list, and the Paris Forum document was too focused on immediate aid effectiveness, not development aid effectiveness. Development effectiveness, as humanitarian aid effectiveness, has no standard definition. However, according to Kim and Lee (2013), development effectiveness implies poverty reduction and addressing development needs, besides being more inclusive of other actors outside the OECD's lead.


The Busan conference in 2011 attempted to solve some of the issues pointed out by Global South countries. In this new High-Level Forum, low-income and middle-income countries, civil society, parliamentarians, and the private sector were included for the first time. It also included high-level representatives, such as U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, United Nations (UN) Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, and the presidents of South Korea, Rwanda, and Jordan at that time. The Busan forum had 3,000 participants, compared to only 500 delegates

at the High-Level Forum in Paris (Eyben and Savage, 2013). In addition, there was a push for development effectiveness instead of aid effectiveness. The Busan outcome document states four common principles: *ownership of development priorities by developing countries, focus on results, inclusive development partnerships, and transparency and accountability* (OECD, 2011). While there is overlap between the Paris and Busan principles, it is important to notice the inclusion in the Busan document of the word “partnership” and the focus on long-term development. In addition to the common principles, the actors agreed on commitments for effective development cooperation, which include ownership, results and accountability, transparent and responsible cooperation, sustainable development in situations of conflict and fragility, and strengthening resilience and reducing vulnerability. Thus, the Busan conference not only covered aid effectiveness but also development effectiveness.

With so many different actors at the conference, Global South countries, such as India and China, argued that the same standards of aid effectiveness could not be applied to both Global North and South, as this could pressure new partners. Therefore, the final Busan Outcome Document established two-tier commitment levels: Global South countries and non-governmental entities accepted the commitment as voluntary guidance, whereas Global North countries accepted it as mandatory. The different standards left some doubt as to whether Global South countries would commit to the principles.

The principles outlined in the Busan Conference, although necessary in order to continue the conversation about aid effectiveness, are too general. For instance, when speaking about *transparency and accountability*, Johnston, senior Researcher at CEPR, asked: “Transparent to whom?” (J. Johnston, personal communication, November 20, 2023). Big organizations tend to be transparent to donors, having several reports in English on their websites, but are not necessarily transparent to their beneficiaries. Considering both the interviews and the principles outlined in the Busan conference, I define effective aid to have the following components (Figure 1): *community ownership, significant results, and transparency and accountability to beneficiaries*. On the other hand, ineffective aid lacks community ownership, presents limited results, and is transparent and accountable to donors, not beneficiaries. Following my main hypothesis, I argue that South donors, be they governments or organizations, provide effective aid when they manage to operate within Southern systems, rejecting colonial and imperialistic relationships.

Figure 1.
Aid Effectiveness Causal Framework



5. The 2010 Earthquake in Haiti

On January 12, 2010, the largest earthquake ever recorded in Haiti devastated several parts of the country, including the capital Port-au-Prince. Estimates of the magnitude 7.0 earthquake death tolls range from 100,000 to more than 300,000 people (Wan, 2021), and nearly a third of Haiti's population was affected by the disaster (Margesson and Taft-Morales, 2010). According to the Inter-American Development Bank, the earthquake's damage was equivalent to 117 percent of Haiti's annual economic output, ranging from at least \$8 billion to as high as \$14 billion. The United Nations had already designated Haiti as one of the 50 least developed countries in the world and the poorest in the Americas, and the 2010 earthquake set back Haiti's nascent infrastructure and development in several areas, including job creation and access to clean water. Haiti's long history of foreign intervention has made its economy extremely dependent on foreign aid. By 1970, foreign assistance constituted 70 percent of Haiti's national treasury revenue (Ramachandran and Walz, 2015).

It was estimated that approximately \$3 billion was spent in aid by the U.S. government, another \$3 billion came from foreign countries, and \$3 billion was donated by NGOs and private citizens (Ramachandran and Walz, 2015, p. 33). However, even though a historical quantity of foreign funds and aid has been sent to Haiti, the Haitian government only received one percent of the humanitarian aid and between 15 and 21 percent of the long-term relief aid (Ramachandran and Walz, 2015, p. 33). Most of the aid went directly to humanitarian agencies, NGOs, private contractors, and other service providers (Ramachandran & Walz, 2015, p. 33). With so much of the aid going directly to NGOs, Haiti had the most NGOs per capita at the end of the twentieth century, and it was cynically referred to as "the Republic of NGOs" (Moestue and Muggah, 2009). In addition

to the small amount of funding directed to the government, another problem that Haitians have faced is the volatility of funding for budget support: in 2010, funding reached \$225 million, and only one year later, it was only \$48.8 million (Ramachandran and Walz, 2015, p. 29). The uncertainty of foreign funding compromises long-term development in Haiti, due to the government's lack of resources to guarantee their citizens' basic needs.

6. Government Responses

6.1. *Brazil's Relationship with Haiti: Friendship or Imperialism?*

Brazil is the most prominent country in discussing humanitarian aid and South-South Cooperation in Latin America. Only during President Lula da Silva's administration from 2003 to 2010 did the government and civil organizations start to pay increased attention to South-South cooperation. Brazilian development cooperation increased from \$160 million in 2005 to over \$900 million in 2010 (Costa Leite et al., 2014). In 2014, the OECD ranked Brazil sixth in the category of non-traditional donors providing aid, and the demand level for the country's cooperation is high (Pickup, 2013). Today, the Brazilian South-South cooperation adopts bilateral, trilateral, and multilateral modalities along with decentralized and non-governmental modalities.

Brazilian and Haitian diplomatic relations started in 1928 and have been uninterrupted since 1954. However, until 2004, the relationship was limited to certain bilateral efforts, and trade was not diversified. At the end of Lula's second mandate, in 2009 and 2010, the federal government tightened its relationship with the Caribbean: after 2005, Haiti received 77 percent of cooperation activities from Brazil in the region (Sánchez Gutiérrez and Gilbert, 2019). The bilateral relationship between the two countries changed dramatically in 2004 when Brazil introduced the United Nations peacekeeping forces, the MINUSTAH, into Haiti. Brazil assumed the leadership of the peace operation with the support of the United States and France. Brazil sent over 1,200 soldiers to Haiti, an action unprecedented in Brazilian history, being the biggest deployment of Brazilian troops outside the country since the Second World War (Sánchez Gutiérrez and Gilbert, 2019). The military task went beyond security and logistics; they were also involved in the Brazilian development and humanitarian aid projects. The Brazilian troops were also important for logistical support and security in the presidential election in 2010, during which Brazil suffered criticism due to the fraud that occurred during the election (Sánchez Gutiérrez and Gilbert, 2019).

Haitian economist, professor, and coordinator of *ALBA Movimientos Haiti*,¹ Camille Chalmers, speaking in an International Colloquium in 2019, stated

1 ALBA Movimientos stands for The Continental Articulation of Social and Popular Movements towards ALBA (*Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra América*, Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America) and is a platform that unites more than 400 organizations from 25 countries. Its main purpose is to integrate Latin America and the Caribbean and build an emancipatory political project for and from the peoples (ALBA Movimientos, n.d.).

that “MINUSTAH’s record in Haiti has been catastrophic for the Haitian people,” as it contributed to the weakening of the Haitian state and increased dependence on the United States, and generated a strategic alliance with the extreme right (Ravena, 2023). Amongst the consequences of the military operation were also the abandonment of soldiers’ children and a cholera epidemic brought by Nepalese soldiers that killed around 40,000 people (Ravena, 2023). Besides the negative legacy left by the operation, other critiques point to the Brazilian self-interest in leading the operation, citing the country’s aspiration to have a permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council and to assume a prominent role as a world leader, not only in the Americas region but internationally (Council on Hemispheric Affairs, 2004). Brazil is also accused of pushing the United States’ interests in Haiti: MINUSTAH is seen as a United States outsourcing. In a 2006 report, a U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) analyst stated that “Conducting a U.S. operation similar to MINUSTAH would cost the United States about 7.5 times as much as its official contribution to the UN for that mission,” which was in part due to higher operational standards (Katz, 2023). Etant Dupain, Haitian community organizer, goes further to say that the military operation started to back up a coup started by Canada, France, and the United States to remove Haiti’s then-president. In this way, he considers that Brazil did the United States’ “dirty work,” and that the country owes an apology to Haitians (E. Dupain, personal communication, November 10, 2023).

In terms of the Brazilian government’s humanitarian assistance to Haiti, the country involved several institutions in advancing their development projects, including the Brazilian Cooperation Agency (*ABC*), the Brazilian Agriculture Research Cooperation (*EMBRAPA*), the Foundation Oswaldo Cruz (*FIOCRUZ*), the National Service of Industrial Studies (*SENAI*), different Brazilian public universities, and the NGO Viva Rio (Sánchez Gutiérrez and Gilbert, 2019). After the earthquake in January, Brazil was the first country to contribute to the Haiti Reconstruction Fund (HRF), which was set up by the Haitian government and a number of bilateral and multilateral donors to allocate resources to the country’s recovery (The World Bank, 2010). Brazil then donated \$55 million to the fund, and the country’s aid pledge was higher than some Global North countries, including Finland, Germany, and France, and was the highest amongst Global South countries (The Guardian Data Blog, 2011).

Immediately after the earthquake, on February 25th, President Lula da Silva visited Haiti, affirmed that the situation in the Caribbean country was more severe than he had thought, and defended the cancellation of the nation’s foreign debt from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (Peixoto, 2010). Accompanied by René Préval, Haiti’s then-president, Lula da Silva also emphasized the autonomy of the Haitian government, saying, “We will subordinate ourselves to the guidance of the Haitian government. It’s Haiti that has to say what it wants us to do and how we do it” (Peixoto, 2010). He also affirmed that Haitians could come to Brazil and that they would be received with open arms (Crawley, 2023).

In 2012, the then Brazilian president Dilma Rousseff also visited Haiti and met with Haiti's then-president Michel Martelly. Two years after the earthquake, the visit's main focus was to "strengthen the ties of friendship and strengthen the cooperation relations between the two nations" (Haiti Libre, 2012). Amongst the main topics were the Haitian migration to Brazil, the health cooperation, and the reduction of Brazilian troops in the country. President Rousseff also reaffirmed the Brazilian compromise to receive Haitians: "As is the nature of Brazilians, we are open to receiving Haitian citizens who choose to seek opportunities in Brazil" (Fellet, 2012). In fact, an estimated 85,000 Haitians arrived in Brazil between 2010 and 2017, mainly encouraged by the humanitarian VISA policies (Yates, 2021).

Brazilian presidents Lula da Silva and Rousseff both demonstrated respect and willingness to cooperate with Haiti, showcased by their official visits to the country, talks with Haitian presidents, use of the language of partnership, and by prioritizing Haitians' needs, beyond their quick response after the earthquake. The Brazilian presidents also focused on the country's long-term recovery by pressuring the international community to cancel Haiti's debt and also through giving humanitarian VISAs to Haitian immigrants. Therefore, official communication between the two countries is based on the South-South Cooperation principles of mutual benefit and partnership. However, Brazil's MINUSTAH leadership goes against those principles and reproduces North-South imperialism since Brazil helped the United States to continue to push its agenda in the Caribbean, damaging the relationship of trust that could have existed between Brazil and Haiti.

6.2. U.S. Relationship with Haiti: A History of Foreign Invasion and Political Interest

The United States has had a contentious and imperialist relationship with Haiti. In 1914, the U.S. Marines arrived in Haiti and removed \$500,000 in gold from Haiti's national bank (Gamio et al., 2022). As this source details, the removal was promoted by the U.S. State Department and the National City Bank of New York, Citigroup's predecessor, which wanted the United States to control the Caribbean country. Following the Marines' invasion, Americans took control of the Haitian government and rewrote the country's constitution. During their occupation, they also forced Haitians to work without payment and even shot those who attempted to escape. They had complete control of Haiti's finances and forced the country to borrow from Wall Street in 1922, despite Haiti's objections (Gamio et al., 2022).

The U.S. occupation lasted nineteen years (1915–1934), but the United States still controlled Haiti's national finances until 1947. As a result, Haitians had little control of their own economy and natural resources, and Haitian farmers were living on a diet close to the starvation level (Gamio et al., 2022).

Furthermore, the United States had a role in forcing five Haitian presidents out of office, largely during the Cold War effort to stop the spread of Communism in the Caribbean (Ramachandran and Walz, 2015). U.S. foreign aid has since been dependent on who is in power: foreign aid rose in 1990 when Jean-Bertrand Aristide was elected president and had support from Washington, but the Bush administration suspended aid immediately in 1991 when Aristide suffered a coup d'état by Raúl Cédras (Ramachandran and Walz, 2015). Besides the suspension of aid, the US enacted an economic embargo and sanctions and froze bank accounts. Even though the embargo exempted basic food items, imports such as seeds and fertilizers, which are essential for mitigating hunger and achieving food security, were blocked (Ramachandran and Walz, 2015).

Bill Clinton's 1992 presidential campaign also mentioned Haiti and promised to reverse the Bush administration's policy on Haitian refugees and enable the return of a democratic government in the Caribbean country, but after the election, the administration kept the embargo and aid suspensions (Ramachandran and Walz, 2015). The Clinton administration then supported an invasion to restore Aristide to power and resumed aid in 1995. After the 2000 Haitian elections, however, the World Bank, the European Union, the Inter-American Development Bank, the United States, Canada, the Netherlands, and France all blocked aid to the Haitian government (Ramachandran and Walz, 2015). The embargo continued through Bush's administration, but foreign policy shifted again in 2004. Aid has been extremely political in Haiti, and every advancement made when aid was flowing could be undermined when the country suffered embargoes (Ramachandran and Walz, 2015). Therefore, aid has been used as a political tool to punish or reward Haiti, depending on its political course.

In March 2009, almost a year before the earthquake hit Haiti, the Secretary of State of Obama's administration, Hillary Clinton, declared Haiti a foreign policy priority for the United States (USAID, 2019). She helped to oversee the \$4.4 billion that Congress had destined for Haiti's recovery by USAID (United States Agency for International Development) (The Guardian Data Blog, 2011). Bill Clinton was also involved in the aid efforts after the earthquake as a co-chairman of the Interim Haiti Recovery Commission (IHRC) alongside Haitian Prime Minister Jean-Max Bellerive. The IHRC was heavily criticized for its response to the earthquake and did not have its mandate renewed by the Haitian parliament in 2011. While the U.S. Government Accountability Office investigations did not find wrongdoings, they reported that IHRC decisions were not aligned with Haitians' priorities (Sheerin, 2016). In theory, the IHRC was supposed to give voice to Haitian demands, but in December 2010, 12 Haitian members of the committee wrote a letter declaring, "In reality, Haitian members of the board have one role: to endorse the decisions made by the director and executive committee," which included Bill Clinton and his allies (Kushner, 2019). Besides their political involvement, the Clintons were also two of Haiti's largest private donors with their personal philanthropic fund,

The Clinton Foundation, which had 34 projects in the country by 2010 (Kushner, 2019). The huge control the Clintons had over Haiti's projects, and how to use the budget after the earthquake, was criticized mainly because they had their own vision of what development looked like, asking for little input from the Haitian population. Given the global context, the significant power imbalance between the United States and Haiti posed a challenge for then-President Michel Martelly to express disagreement with the Clintons. In 2010, Bill Clinton admitted that several U.S. policies intended to help Haiti had actually slowed its development, mainly in the agricultural sector. In a speech addressing Congress, he said: "The United States has followed a policy . . . that we rich countries that produce a lot of food should sell it to poor countries and relieve them of the burden of producing their own food, so, thank goodness, they can leap directly into the industrial era. . . . It may have been good for some of my farmers in Arkansas, but it has not worked. . . . I have to live every day with the consequences of the lost capacity to produce a rice crop in Haiti to feed those people" (Kushner, 2019). By the time the earthquake hit Haiti, the country was importing 80 percent of rice when, in the 1970s, it had been self-sufficient (Kushner, 2019).

President Barack Obama did not visit Haiti, but on March 22nd, 2010, former presidents George W. Bush and Bill Clinton visited the Caribbean country and were appointed by Obama to spearhead fundraising for the crisis. Bush said that seeing the disaster firsthand is different than seeing it on TV and that "hopefully our visit will remind people that Haiti needs help" (Katz and Melia, 2010). Clinton also mentioned the need to work together with the Haitian government, stating that "the most important thing in the short run is to coordinate what the NGOs do with the long-term plans that the Haitian government has. They can't be a self-sufficient country unless we both are transparent in this aid and build the capacity of the government" (Katz and Melia, 2010). Haitians welcomed their visit, but around 100 protesters burned tires and an American flag to demand the return of ousted President Jean-Bertrand Aristide, who was escorted out of Haiti by the U.S. military in 1991 during Bush's administration (Katz and Melia, 2010).

Even though Clinton was vocal about equipping the Haitian government with the necessary tools to rebuild the country, the United States did not directly aid the Caribbean country's state due to the Dole Amendment passed in Congress in 1995. The Congress argued that the Haitian government was too corrupt and channeled the aid through USAID (Edmonds, 2013). Thus, this amendment undermines the trust and partnership that Clinton and Bush wanted to convey in their speeches. Although Clinton's apology for promoting food aid policies that destroyed Haiti's rice production was important, it is necessary to see concrete actions from the U.S. government to attempt to remedy the damage of decades of occupation and financial control. In addition, Obama did not visit Haiti after the disaster, which further prevented a partnership between the two countries from developing.

7. NGOs' Work in Haiti

7.1. *Global South Organization Operating through the Global North*

System: Viva Rio in Haiti

Viva Rio is a Brazilian organization founded in 1993 by several civil society representatives to combat violence in Rio de Janeiro, focusing on vulnerable communities in slums or favelas. They have an institutional vision that strives for “a society that integrates security and civil rights, justice and freedom, development and the environment, modernity, and cultural diversity,” and they implement their work through “innovative solutions” for social and environmental problems and conflict mediation (Schmitz, 2014, p. 77). Since its foundation, the organization has received recognition for its social work in Brazil (*Colunistas Rio de Janeiro* Award in the Cases category and Integrated Media in 2012) and Haiti (Makes a Difference Award, World category, 2011).

Before starting their operations in Port-au-Prince, Haiti, Viva Rio had 13 years of experience in Rio de Janeiro. The recognition of their work in Rio and their expertise in themes related to global governance made the organization part of the UN's advisory board, and later, Viva Rio participated in the debate on disarmament and the fight against drugs at the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), the United Nations invited Viva Rio to work on rebuilding the Haitian state. The organization's familiarity with urban conflicts in poor neighborhoods and the cultural familiarity between Brazilians and Haitians were also evoked as good reasons why the organization should be present in Haitian communities, helping export social technologies to combat violence (Schmitz, 2014).

The beginning of Viva Rio's operation in Haiti is intrinsically connected to the Brazilian participation in the MINUSTAH. Siman Gomes (2014) points out that in the official Brazilian discourse, the lack of success in the previous attempts to rebuild Haiti is due to other missions' excessive focus on security issues without seeing the Haitian problem from a multidimensional perspective. In this way, Viva Rio was an essential part of the Brazilian narrative of building peace differently; it was in this narrative that the approximation with the community and the transfer of social technologies that worked in Brazil took place. Viva Rio sought, from the outset, to combine its efforts in the city center of Port-au-Prince with a broader initiative to raise the level of “understanding” among the “stabilizers,” particularly those who used force and those who offered development within MINUSTAH (Gois, 2019). In short, the NGO's objective was to unite security and development at the micro level (Gois, 2019).

Moestue and Muggah (2009) emphasize the complexity of this dual reality of the Brazilian NGO (with agents working in the field of development and security at the same time) and point out that there can be contradictions between security objectives, which tend to be short-term and are geared towards the interests of political agents concerned with establishing social order, and those of development, which have a long-term approach and are oriented towards

the community's basic needs and desires. Interviews conducted by Schmitz with former Viva Rio Haiti employees revealed concerns of the Haitian population and other development partners about this dichotomy in the organization's work. It was reported that the relationship between the Brazilian NGO and the security agents is sometimes a source of rumors and suspicions from other interlocutors, especially those linked to development operations (Schmitz, 2014). In the interview with Etant Dupain, a community organizer in Haiti in the aftermath of the 2010 earthquake, I could see the same suspicion in his words when he defined the NGOs' work as the "pretty face of the Brazilian military in Haiti" (E. Dupain, personal communication, November 10, 2023).

However, despite several studies' focus on the role of Viva Rio as part of the Brazilian pacification operation, it is important to mention that the NGO also operated in the neighborhoods of Bel Air, Cité Soleil, Bom Repos, and Arcaye, in the sectors of health, education, environment, and community security, which are the same sectors that the organization operates in Rio de Janeiro. Even though the MINUSTAH ended in 2017, Viva Rio Haiti continues to operate in Haiti, and when the director of Viva Rio, Rubens César Fernandes, was asked how long the NGO would stay in the country, the answer was: "Not only do we intend to stay there permanently, but we are also studying our participation in other locations, in other countries and on other continents" (Schmitz, 2014, p. 85). This demonstrates that the NGO was not only part of a military operation but had broader development goals with the community.

When Viva Rio started its operations in Haiti, the organization's main donors were the Canadian and Norwegian governments and the MINUSTAH operation. After the 2010 earthquake, the Viva Rio's team increased significantly: they had 1,450 workers, and 98 percent were Haitians, including in management and operation positions (Schmitz, 2014). After 2011, however, with the end of some contracts and non-renewal from Northern donors, especially Canadians, the organization needed to reduce its team and, consequently, had to fire many workers.

Due to Brazilian domestic regulations, even though Viva Rio is headquartered in Brazil, their funding source must be separate from Viva Rio Haiti's source (Schmitz, 2014). In 2014, they had 250 workers, most of whom were from the Bel Air community (Schmitz, 2014). Amongst the workers, there are Brazilians, Pakistanis, U.S. citizens, Spanish, and Burundis. Most professionals are paid, since the high poverty level and unstable conditions in the country make it difficult for the local population to work as volunteers (Schmitz, 2014).

Before the earthquake, a significant drop was observed in the homicide rate in the Bel Air neighborhood, from 26 deaths per 100,000 inhabitants in 2006–2007 to 17 deaths in 2008–2009 (Moestue and Muggah, 2009). Viva Rio Haiti said that other communities, such as Cité de Soleil, have pressured the organization to work in their territory. However, according to the organization's 2011 report, the earthquake caused a major setback in the pacification process in

the Bel Air community, with a spike in homicides in 2010 (Moestue and Muggah, 2009). Viva Rio concluded that the previous pacts lost their effectiveness after the earthquake, and the violence in Bel Air is once again a cause for concern. In May 2011, 105 community leaders signed a new peace pact, but despite the record number of signatories, the pact seems to have had limited effects (Moestue and Muggah, 2009).

Therefore, the organization used its expertise acquired operating in Brazilian marginalized communities to cooperate with the Haitian population, which constitutes an example of the application of South-South cooperation, in which a Global South country shared its knowledge in combating conflict in its own country with another Global South country that is experiencing similar issues. However, a common critique of the NGO operation in Haiti is that, even though the organization had listened to the Haitian communities they were working with before starting their activities, the decision of the sectors in which they wanted to work in the Haitian community, as well as the methodology, mirrored the Brazilian experience too closely. Thus, in the Aid Effectiveness Framework, the *community ownership* criteria was not fulfilled, as the Haitian population had little or no voice in designing the aid strategy. In addition, because Viva Rio came with the Brazilian troops, gaining Haitians' trust was hard since the military exerted authority and imperialism, which contrasted with the organization's purpose. The lack of *community ownership* led to *limited results*, as was proved by the increase of homicides after 2010, counting against one of their main metrics of success. Finally, since Viva Rio receives its funding from the Global North, it is still subject to Global North countries' political agendas; when Canada decided to withdraw funding, there was a significant reduction in the organization's operation, even though it still needed to run several projects. The *accountability to donors* over beneficiaries is influenced by the fact that the donors are from the Global North, and also that the organizations have a close relationship with the Brazilian army. This results in a lack of accountability to the local population, as these donor operations are seen with mistrust. In sum, Viva Rio can be considered a Global South donor operating through Global North systems and delivering ineffective aid.

7.2. Global North Organization Operating through Global North

Systems: American Red Cross

The American Red Cross (ARC) is an independent organization supported by public donations and volunteerism, founded in 1881. Its mission is to “provide relief to victims of disasters and help people prevent, prepare for and respond to emergencies” (Center for Ethical Organizational Cultures, 2013, p. 1). On average, the ARC responds to more than 70,000 disasters annually, and the organization has made significant contributions to emergencies and blood donations (Center for Ethical Organizational Cultures, 2013). The ARC follows

the seven fundamental principles to which all Red Cross societies must conform: humanity, impartiality, neutrality, independence, voluntary service, unity, and universality (Center for Ethical Organizational Cultures, 2013). However, since the early twenty-first century, it has received criticism in several international and domestic humanitarian operations. Some examples include their response to Hurricane Katrina in 2005, and their work in Haiti in 2010; the latter will be the focus of this section (Center for Ethical Organizational Cultures, 2013).

The American Red Cross was, by far, the organization that received the most U.S. funding in the aftermath of the natural disaster in Haiti (ARC received \$12.7 million in 2012, while the second-place Mercy Corps received \$4.7 million), according to the Center for Disaster Philanthropy (2014). ARC launched a text messaging donation campaign promoted by Michelle Obama, several Congress members, and celebrities, and therefore, it was the go-to organization for millions of Americans who wanted to donate. Consequently, the charity had one of its most successful fundraising efforts, raising almost half a billion dollars (Sullivan, 2015). As the biggest humanitarian NGO operating in Haiti in 2010, the ARC could be expected to have transparency and accountability in the NGO's operations. However, months and years after the earthquake had passed, neither Americans nor the international community, much less Haitians, knew where the money had gone.

The lack of transparency in ARC's operations and the promises that were not fulfilled prompted documentaries, such as the 2012 documentary *Haiti: Where Did the Money Go* by director Michele Mitchell, and several news outlets denounced the ARC's misuse of funds. CEPR reported that the three-month report in 2010 stated that the organization had distributed relief to 400,000 people, the same number they had in their two-month report. This raises questions as to whether the organization was not able to assist anyone new in a month or reported their reach inaccurately. When questioned about its actions, ARC released a statement on April 8, 2010, that mentioned it had provided 111,000 tarps (CEPR, 2010). However, the Shelter Cluster, an Inter-Agency Standing Committee coordination mechanism that supports people affected by disasters and internally displaced people, reported that the International Federation of the Red Cross network had only distributed 72,654 tarps (CEPR, 2010). Similarly, in the three-month report released by ARC after the earthquake, it had built only 200 latrines in the past month, which is a very low number considering sanitation was a top priority (CEPR, 2010). USAID also noted that from their plan to build 15,300 latrines, only 8,727 had been built (CEPR, 2010). Even though Shelter Cluster's report from April 26 stated that 99.6 percent of those in need had received shelter materials, OCHA (Office Coordination for Humanitarian Affairs) reported in the same month that constant rain had proved that the tents' material was not waterproof, which required additional plastic sheeting. In addition, rope and tool kits, essential to guarantee a safer shelter, only reached 37 percent and 11 percent of those in need, respectively (CEPR, 2010).

Perhaps the news that caused the most indignation was the fact that ARC promised to build hundreds of homes through the *LAMIKA* (an acronym in Haitian Creole for “A Better Life in My Neighborhood”) in 2011 but built only six homes in Haiti, even though the organization stated that it had built 130,000 permanent homes (Elliot and Sullivan, 2015). Each home would have “finished floors, toilets, showers, even rainwater collection systems” (Elliot and Sullivan, 2015). Even though the ARC blamed Haiti’s dysfunctional land title system for the project’s failure, other organizations were able to build 9,000 homes. Carline Noailles, the project manager in Washington, said the ARC experienced challenges and delays because the organization “didn’t have the know-how” (Elliot and Sullivan, 2015).

According to an investigation by ProPublica and NPR, current and former employees had mentioned that one of the issues that hindered ARC’s work in Haiti was the overreliance on foreign staff who did not speak French or Creole (Elliot and Sullivan, 2015). CEPR (2012) also noticed that meetings with NGOs within the UN Cluster system, where they discussed key coordinating efforts, took place in only French and English, not Creole. Wilma Vidal, a resident of Camp Toussaint L’Ouverture, stated that the Red Cross “is the decision maker” where she lives, in the documentary *Haiti: Where Did the Money Go?* (CEPR, 2012).

In addition, the director of the Haiti program in 2011, Judith St. Forth, denounced racist comments made by senior management to Haitian employees. The ProPublica report also stated that ARC’s lack of expertise in implementing its own projects made it give much of the money to other groups to do the work, which then increased the overhead cost of the projects, even though the ARC had reported that 91 cents of every dollar goes to programs and services (Martinez, 2015). The investigation also noticed that ARC continued to solicit money after it had enough for emergency relief, which contrasted with other organizations, such as Doctors Without Borders, which stopped its fundraising efforts after it saw that it had enough money to conduct its operations (Elliot and Sullivan, 2015).

Thus, the American Red Cross could not communicate well with the community it intended to help and did not prioritize the community’s needs. From the conducted analysis, it is possible to infer that the ARC was the main decision-maker and lacked the skills and knowledge to communicate with the community. Thus, the first criterion of the Aid Effectiveness Framework, *community ownership*, was not fulfilled. This led to the *limited results* of the organization’s operations in Haiti. After its failure in delivering aid, the *accountability* was only to donors, as most of the statements justifying its lack of effectiveness were made in English and published on their website, leaving the Haitian population unaware of the organization’s financial resources and the reasons behind its failure. Ultimately, the ARC was a Global North Organization operating through Global North systems and, as a result, delivered ineffective aid.

7.3. Global South Organization Operating through Global South

Systems: MST and the Brigada Dessalines

The Brazilian Landless Worker's Movement, or *Movimento dos Trabalhadores sem Teto (MST)*, originated in the 1980s. The organization has three main objectives: fight for land, fight for land reform, and fight for a fair and fraternal society (MST, n.d.-a). To achieve these goals, the organization "develop[s] agricultural cooperation as a concrete act of mutual aid that strengthens solidarity and enhances the production conditions of the settled families, as well as improving income and working conditions in the countryside" (MST, n.d.-b). MST is present in 24 Brazilian states, and MST rural settlements are major agricultural producers. Production is carried out by 160 cooperatives, 120 agro-industries, and 1900 associations spread across most of the Brazilian states, totaling more than 450,000 settled families (Guitarrara, 2024). MST's production is also recognized regionally as Latin America's most significant producer of organic rice for over a decade (Guitarrara, 2024). MST is also part of the *Via Campesina Brasil* (in Spanish and Portuguese, "the peasants' way"), an international organization founded in 1993 in Belgium and comprised of 182 organizations in 81 countries. It is "an international movement which coordinates peasant organizations of small and middle-scale producers, agricultural workers, rural women, and indigenous communities from Asia, Africa, America, and Europe" (*La Via Campesina*, 2021).

In 2004, when it was announced that foreign troops would be arriving in Haiti, Haitian social movements appealed to their Latin American fellows for cooperation other than through the military. Then, through the *Via Campesina Brasil*, MST and other civilian rural movements organized the Dessalines Brigade (*Brigada Dessalines*), named after the Haitian liberator Jean-Jacques Dessalines (Gombata, 2014). Before settling on Haitian soil in January 2009, the project members underwent two months of training at the Florestan Fernandes National School, founded by the MST (Gombata, 2014). The group initially had ten members and grew to 76 when the earthquake struck in 2010. In 2014, participants included two Brazilians, a Cuban and an Argentinian (Gombata, 2014).

Among Haiti's most representative and combative peasant movements are those that come together on the "4G" platform, an acronym derived from the Creole expression *4 je kontre, manti kaba* (when four eyes meet, the lie is over). 4G is made up of *Mouvman Tèt Kole Ti Peyizan Ayisien (TK or Tèt Kole)*, *Mouvman Peyizan Papay (MPP)*, *Mouvman Konbit Peyizan Kongrè Papay (MPNKP)* and *Kowodinasyon Rejyonal Oganizasyon Sidès (KROS)*. Of these movements, only KROS is not part of *La Via Campesina International*, as it is formed by a group of organizations that are not only peasant but also urban. The 4G coordination meetings, which include two representatives from each organization, occur at least every three months and are used to articulate actions,

policies, and deliberations. The main objective is to consolidate a common plan of activism and activities in the country (Bezerra, 2016).

Bezerra also notices that the solidarity movement that started in the Brazilian peasants' organizations goes beyond a response to the military occupation, since the Haitian revolution has inspired many Brazilian workers to this day. Bezerra notes: "Less than a year after the island's independence was proclaimed, in Rio de Janeiro, black soldiers wore medallions with Dessalines' face on them" (2016, p. 112). Therefore, the two countries have similarities as they share a colonial past and a fight for independence and liberty for enslaved people, which could lead to joint solutions in the future.

In January of 2009, one year before the earthquake, the Dessalines Brigade sent the first four militants to Haiti (four Brazilians, mostly from MST) to carry out a reconnaissance of the Haitian territory, a diagnosis of soil conditions, a survey of agricultural production, and an evaluation of the dynamics of society. They established their headquarters in L'Artibonite, two hours and a half from Port-au-Prince. The Brazilian agricultural worker André Luis Guimarães, when interviewed about the progress of their work in Haiti, emphasized the importance of knowing Haitian Creole, as most of the communication was through radio (Taddeo, 2012). He also raised the issue of racial dynamics, writing: "When Haitians don't know you, everyone who is a foreigner is *blan* (white, in Haitian Creole). Then, when you speak their language, which is not common, they are more receptive. As we work and live with farmers, they treat us [well,] to the best of their abilities. You can't explain the dedication with which they treat you when they know you're making a contribution" (Taddeo, 2012). The agronomist Dayana Mezzonato added: "There is a very strong racial issue here. It's a society where more than 90 percent of the population is black, so their first view is that white people are colonizers and have money. At first, they called us *blan* so much that it was annoying. But as the volunteers spend a lot of time in the community, the openness is incredible. They love Brazil, which is a positive factor, but to win their trust, we had to live with them, show them that there are poor whites in the world, that solidarity happens between peoples, and that we are learning together" (Taddeo, 2012).

In January 2010, before the earthquake happened, the Brigade members had returned to Brazil to articulate a plan with Via Campesina Brasil to put the proposals they had with 4G in motion. They were then surprised by the news of the earthquake, and at Via Campesina Brasil's General Assembly, they decided to send 30 militants from several Brazilian organizations to act on four main fronts: Water Collection and Distribution, Seed production, Environmental recovery, and Education (Bezerra, 2016). In the same year, the Brigade installed 1500 cisterns in peasants' homes, donated by the government of Bahia, a Brazilian state, and transported by the Secretariat for International Action to Combat Hunger of the Ministry of Brazilian Foreign Affairs (Taddeo, 2012). The Brigade's leader, José Luis (known as *Patrola*), added that, even though 1500 is not a large number, the

families live close to each other and share up to five cisterns per family (Taddeo, 2012).

As part of the Education front, the Brigade was able to send 74 young Haitians who represented different peasant movements to Brazil. For a year, the Haitians participated in technical and political training activities with the Via Campesina Brasil movements, mainly in Paraná, Sergipe, and São Paulo (Bezerra, 2016). They also visited the settlements and engaged in agro-ecological practices, the mystique of the movements and militant praxis. Upon their return to Haiti, the young people from Tèt Kole organized an event where they debated agendas for the peasant youth and their inclusion in the movement, and ensured that young people played a leading role in all spaces. As of the 2016 report, this exchange program continues to take place on a smaller scale (Bezerra, 2016). Another Education measure that the MST wanted to implement was the National Center for Training and Agroecology. The 4G platform designated Tèt Kole as the recipient of this project, as it already had a large unused space in the rural area of Monwi and needed to revitalize it in order to make it functional for training activists and technicians for the TK grassroots group and other movements (Bezerra, 2016). The work involved renovating an unfinished building on the site: building bedrooms, bathrooms, a kitchen, a pantry, and a large space for meetings and training. At the same time, the area was fenced off so that it could house livestock and crops, and work began on the construction of a water collection channel. Little by little, the center was occupied by the movement to hold meetings, assemblies, and training events, which reflected the quality of the revitalization of the space (Bezerra, 2016).

On the front of Seed Production, Via Campesina used the experience of Brazilian movements in the *Bionatur Sementes Agroecológicas* (Bionatur Agroecological Seeds), a cooperative organized by Brazilian peasant social movements, to produce agro-ecological seeds in small agricultural settlements (Bezerra, 2016). Their action contrasted with Monsanto's donation of 60 tons of hybrid seeds to Haitian agricultural workers, which was rejected by the Haitian peasant movements with a march of around 10,000 peasants in June 2010 from Papaye to Hinche in the country's central plateau (Bezerra, 2016). The U.S. company United Parcel Service delivered the Monsanto seeds, while USAID distributed them as part of the five-year Winner project (Grain, 2010). The agricultural workers burnt several bags of hybrid maize seeds, and the slogans for the march included "Long live native maize" and "Monsanto's GMO and hybrid seeds violate peasant agriculture" (Grain, 2010). *Bionatur* provided the first Via Campesina seeds and the training needed to produce each type of seed. Brigade activists acted as technical assistants and animators in the communities and sought to sensitize peasants to the importance of properly producing and storing their own seeds, as well as rescuing the history of the relationship and improving the peasantry's relationship with seeds, both in the movement's decision-making bodies and at the grassroots level, where seed houses would

be built and seed fields installed (Bezerra, 2016). The project lasted two years, and in the end, five seed houses were installed, three for vegetables (Kenskof/West, Tyòt/Southeast, and Akayè/West) and two for grains (Podepè/Northeast and Hinche/Central Plateau), with an average of fifteen producer families in each center. The production fields were directed to localities already suitable for producing those crops (Bezerra, 2016). The families selected for seed production received the seeds for multiplication along with technical assistance and had to pass their knowledge to other families sustainably to keep the peasant tradition of saving and exchanging seeds, thus guaranteeing the diversity and quality of production (Bezerra, 2016).

Finally, on the front of Environmental Recovery, the Brigade developed a project that combined the planting of forest species, the genetic improvement of Creole local goat herds, and the production of vegetables in four communities in the department of Latibonit, where the Brigade's training center and that of Tèt Kole were located (Bezerra, 2016). Bezerra was the technician responsible for the project and outlined some challenges on this environmental front, as the efforts did not yield results immediately and needed some long-term efforts such as training and environmental education in schools.

In general, the Dessalines Brigade emphasized the autonomy of Haitian peasant groups and stated that their actions in the country can only continue as long as Haitians see them as partners. Therefore, the organization successfully fulfilled the *community ownership* criteria. Furthermore, Bezerra (2016) stated that the work of cooperation between Venezuela and Cuba with Haiti served as an inspiration for cooperation models for MST. After analysis of their operations, it is possible to conclude that the organization achieved *significant results* in the communities, and prioritized *transparency and accountability to its beneficiaries*, rather than only to donors. In fact, Johnston noted that MST does not heavily invest in showcasing their results on their website, but everyone in the community they work with is well aware of their activities and results (J. Johnston, personal communication, November 20, 2023). Both interviewees, Johnston and Dupain, had positive comments about MST's work in Haiti and would consider the organization to be an example of a successful South-South cooperation that continues to exhibit good results. Thus, MST is a Global South donor operating in Southern systems, and it delivers effective aid.

8. Conclusion

Aligning with existing literature on South-South Cooperation and exemplified in the case of Brazil's engagement with Haiti, the choice of language and the level of respect shown towards the recipient country, for example in increased official visits, can be considered an improvement in the donor-recipient relationship fostered by South-South cooperation. However, Global South countries are also driven by self-interest and can use such cooperation to push Global North agendas in the developing world.

Examining the presence of NGOs in the country, funding has not been an obstacle for large NGOs, like the Red Cross, but the lack of experience and knowledge about Haitian society has limited their impact and contributed to serious mistakes in delivering aid. Both Southern organizations seemed more prepared to carry out projects and deliver aid than the Red Cross, since they had years of experience working with similar communities in Brazil. However, Viva Rio reproduced imperialist relationships in working alongside MINUSTAH, the United Nations, and other Northern donors, which diminished their impact and perceived trustworthiness in the community. It can also be argued that their projects mimic their work in Brazil too closely, which could have diminished their results.

The Landless Workers' Movement (MST) cooperation in Haiti serves as an exemplary instance of solidarity between peasants in both countries. It stood out as the only case embodying South-South Cooperation principles by respecting Haitian ownership, delivering tangible results, and maintaining transparency and accountability to Haitians. Despite receiving limited funding, the MST successfully executed its operations, positively impacting the lives of numerous Haitians. This challenges the assertion by Quadir (2013) that financial assistance is a prerequisite for Global South countries to influence the humanitarian aid system. A comparative analysis of the Red Cross and MST operations indicates that the effectiveness lies not solely in funding but in the approach to operations.

Our detailed examination of three NGOs and the responses of both Brazil and the United States to Haiti's earthquake suggests that, despite Brazil's professed commitment to South-South principles, the government and its primary NGO, Viva Rio, were unable to disrupt the hierarchical dynamics of the humanitarian system, ultimately following the lead of the Global North. However, this paper posits that Global South countries and civilian communities can indeed operate through South-South Cooperation by actively engaging with and listening to the community, as exemplified by the MST in Haiti. While the findings can be applied to Haiti after the 2010 earthquake, more research is needed to support the argument in different humanitarian emergencies.

References

- Abdenur, A. E., & Da Fonseca, J. M. E. M. (2013). The North's growing role in South-South cooperation: Keeping the foothold. *Third World Quarterly*, 34(8), 1475–1491.
- Agencia Brasileira de Cooperação. (2013). *Manual de Gestão da Cooperação Técnica Sul-Sul*.
- ALBA Movimientos (n.d.). *Nuestro proyecto*. <https://albamovimientos.net/nuestro-proyecto/>
- Appe, S. (2018). Directions in a post-aid world? South-South development cooperation and CSOs in Latin America. *VOLUNTAS: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations*, 29, 271–283.
- Bezerra, L. M. B. (2016). A cooperação internacional na agricultura haitiana: Um konbit para o desenvolvimento territorial. *REVISTA NERA*, 34(19), 107–118.
- Binder, A., & Meier, C. (2011). Opportunity knocks: Why non-Western donors enter humanitarianism and how to make the best of it. *International Review of the Red Cross*, 93(884), 1135–1149.
- Brigada Dessalines. (2020). Brigada Dessalines desenvolve trabalho de solidariedade há 11 anos no Haiti. *Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra*. <https://mst.org.br/2020/09/18/brigada-dessalines-desenvolve-trabalho-de-solidariedade-ha-11-anos-no-haiti/>
- Bureau Intégré des Nations Unies en Haïti. (2010). *Report of the United Nations in Haiti 2010: Situation, challenges and outlook*. United Nations.
- Center for Disaster Philanthropy. (2014). *Measuring the state of disaster philanthropy 2014*. <https://disasterphilanthropy.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/CDP-State-of-Disaster-Philanthropy-2014.pdf>
- Center for Ethical Organizational Cultures. (2013). *The American Red Cross faces organizational integrity challenges*. Auburn University, (1–11). <https://harbert.auburn.edu/binaries/documents/center-for-ethical-organizational-cultures/cases/american-red-cross.pdf>
- CEPR. (2010, April 28). *Scrutiny of Red Cross effort grows*. Haiti Relief & Reconstruction Watch. <https://cepr.net/scrutiny-of-red-cross-effort-grows/>
- CEPR. (2012, January 25). *Why doesn't the American Red Cross want people to see "Haiti: Where did the money go?"* Haiti Relief & Reconstruction Watch. <https://cepr.net/why-doesnt-the-american-red-cross-want-people-to-see-qhaiti-where-did-the-money-goq/>

- Cochrane, L. (2021). The United Arab Emirates as a global donor: What a decade of foreign aid data transparency reveals. *Development Studies Research*, 8(1), 49–62.
- Costa Leite, I., Suyama, B., Trajber Waisbich, L., Pomeroy, M., Constantine, J., Navas-Alemán, L., Shankland, A., & Younis, M. (2014). Brazil's engagement in international development cooperation: The state of the debate. *IDS Evidence Report*, (59).
- Council on Hemispheric Affairs. (2004, December 6). *Brazil's peacekeeping mission in Haiti: Doing God's or Washington's work?* COHA. <https://coha.org/brazil%E2%80%99s-peacekeeping-mission-in-haiti-doing-god%E2%80%99s-or-washington%E2%80%99s-work/>
- Crawley, H. (2023, January 10). *From despair to hope? Securing rights for Haitian migrants in the new Brazil*. United Nations University Centre for Policy Research. <https://unu.edu/cpr/blog-post/despair-hope-securing-rights-haitian-migrants-new-brazil>
- De Torrenté, N. (2013). The relevance and effectiveness of humanitarian aid: Reflections about the relationship between providers and recipients. *Social Research*, 80(2), 607–634.
- Edmonds, K. (2013, January 24). *CIDA continues its history of controversy in Haiti*. NACLA. <https://nacla.org/blog/2013/1/24/cida-continues-its-history-controversy-haiti>
- Elliot, J., & Sullivan, L. (2015, June 3). *How the Red Cross raised half a billion dollars for Haiti and built six homes*. ProPublica. <https://www.propublica.org/article/how-the-red-cross-raised-half-a-billion-dollars-for-haiti-and-built-6-homes>
- Eyben, R., & Savage, L. (2013). Emerging and submerging powers: Imagined geographies in the new development partnership at the Busan Fourth High Level Forum. *The Journal of Development Studies*, 49(4), 457–469.
- Fellet, J. (2012, February 1). *Dilma diz que haitianos são bem-vindos no Brasil, mas condena ação de coiotes*. BBC. https://www.bbc.com/portuguese/noticias/2012/02/120131_haiti_dilma_jf
- Gamio, L., Meheut, C., Porter, C., Gebrekidan, S., McCann, A., & Apuzzo, M. (2022, May 20). Haiti's lost billions. *The New York Times*. <https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2022/05/20/world/americas/enslaved-haiti-debt-timeline.html>
- Global Humanitarian Overview 2022. (2022). OCHA. <https://2022.gho.unocha.org/>

- Gois, D. A. (2019). *A Viva Rio no Haiti: uma análise das ações sociais da ONG e da sua participação na MINUSTAH*. [Dissertation, Pontifical Catholic University of São Paulo]. PUC-SP Repository.
- Gombata, M. (2014, August 12). Com membros do MST, Brigada Dessalines ajuda movimentos sociais no Haiti. *America Latina em movimento*. <https://www.alainet.org/es/node/102407>
- Gomes, M. S. (2014). *Pacificação como prática de “política externa” de (re) produção do self estatal: Rescrevendo o engajamento do Brasil na Missão das Nações Unidas para a Estabilização no Haiti (MINUSTAH)*. (Publication No. 0912325/CA) [Doctoral dissertation, Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro] PUC-Rio Repository.
- Grain. (2010, July 13). *Haiti's farmers call for a break with neoliberalism*. <https://grain.org/en/article/4056-haiti-s-farmers-call-for-a-break-with-neoliberalism>
- The Guardian Data Blog. (2011). *Haiti earthquake aid pledged by country*. <https://www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/2010/jan/14/haiti-quake-aid-pledges-country-donations>
- Guha-Sapir, D., Kirsch, T., Dooling, S., Sirois, A., & DerSarkissian, M. (2011). *Independent review of the US government response to the Haiti earthquake*. The United States Agency for International Development (USAID).
- Guitarrara, P. (2024). *MST: Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra*. Brasil Escola. <https://brasilecola.uol.com.br/sociologia/mst.htm>
- Haiti Libre. (2012, February 2). *Haiti-Politic: The President Martelly met the President of Brazil Dilma Rousseff*. <https://www.haitilibre.com/en/news-4865-haiti-politic-the-president-martelly-met-the-president-of-brazil-dilma-rousseff.html>
- IFRC. (2024). *The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement*. <https://www.ifrc.org/who-we-are/international-red-cross-and-red-crescent-movement>
- Katz, J. (2023, November 7). *The U.S. is preparing an outsourced invasion of Haiti: Repeated interventions have done nothing to aid Haitians*. Foreign Policy Magazine. <https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/11/07/haiti-kenya-invasion-gang-war-united-states/>
- Katz, J., & Melia, M. (2010, March 22). Presidents Bush, Clinton visit devastated Haiti. *The San Diego Union-Tribune*. <https://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/sdut-presidents-bush-clinton-visit-devastated-haiti-2010mar22-story.html>

- Kim, E. M., & Lee, J. E. (2013). Busan and beyond: South Korea and the transition from aid effectiveness to development effectiveness. *Journal of International Development*, 25(6), 787–801.
- Kushner, J. (2019, October 11). Haiti and the failed promise of US aid. *The Guardian*. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/oct/11/haiti-and-the-failed-promise-of-us-aid>
- Main, A., Huggins, J., Johnston, J., Zehr, C., Hsu, J., & Yarborough, A. (2016). A Critical Review of the US State Department's 2015 Progress Report on Haiti. *Center for Economic and Policy Research and the Haiti Advocacy Working Group*.
- Margesson, R., & Taft-Morales, M. (2010). Haiti earthquake: Crisis and response. *Congressional Research Service*.
- Martinez, M. (2015, June 5). *Red Cross responds to report about building only six homes in Haiti after the 2010 quake*. CNN. <https://edition.cnn.com/2015/06/04/americas/american-red-cross-haiti-controversy-propublica-npr/index.html>
- Meibo, H. (2014). South-South cooperation, North-South aid and the prospect of international aid architecture. *Journal of International Development*, 26(7), 869–883.
- Mitchell, M. (Director). (2012). *Haiti: Where Did the Money Go?* [Film]. Film at Eleven Media.
- Moestue, H., & Muggah, R. (2009). Social integration ergo stabilization: Assessing Viva Rio's security and development programme in Port-au-Prince. *Viva Rio, Geneva and Rio de Janeiro*.
- MST (n.d.-a). *Objetivos*. <https://mst.org.br/objetivos/#:~:text=Desde%20a%20nossa%20funda%C3%A7%C3%A3o%2C>
- MST (n.d.-b). *Nossa produção*. <https://mst.org.br/nossa-producao/>
- OECD. (2011). *Busan partnership for effective development co-operation: Fourth high level forum on aid effectiveness, Busan, Republic of Korea, 29 November–1 December 2011*. OECD Publishing. <https://doi.org/10.1787/54de7baa-en>
- Peixoto, F. (2010, February 25). *Lula diz que situação do Haiti 'é pior do que imaginava'*. BBC. https://www.bbc.com/portuguese/noticias/2010/02/100225_lula_haiti_fa_cq
- Pickup, M. (2013). Evaluating Brazilian South-South cooperation in Haiti. *Third World Quarterly*, 39(10), 1941–1961.

- Quadir, F. (2013). Rising donors and the new narrative of ‘South-South’ cooperation: What prospects for changing the landscape of development assistance programmes? *Third World Quarterly*, 34(2), 321–338.
- Ramachandran, V., & Walz, J. (2015). Haiti: Where has all the money gone? *Journal of Haitian Studies*, 21(1), 26–65.
- Ravena, M. (2023, September 14). *Brazilian government must develop ‘new cooperation’ with Haiti*. Peoples Dispatch. <https://peoplesdispatch.org/2023/09/14/brazilian-government-must-develop-new-cooperation-with-haiti/>
- Richey, L. A., Gissel, L. E., Kweka, O. L., Bærendtsen, P., Kragelund, P., Hambati, H. Q., & Mwamfupe, A. (2021). South-South humanitarianism: The case of Covid-organics in Tanzania. *World development*, 141, Article 105375.
- Sánchez Gutiérrez, G., & Gilbert, R. (2019). *Coopération internationale en Haïti: Tensions et leçons. Les cas du Brésil, du Chili et du Mexique*. CEPALC.
- Schmitz, G. D. O. (2014). *A Sociedade civil brasileira e a cooperação sul-sul para o desenvolvimento: estudo de caso do Viva Rio no Haiti*. Boletim de Economia e Política Internacional. 16, 76–89.
- Sheerin, J. (2016, November 2). *US election 2016: What really happened with the Clintons in Haiti?* BBC. <https://www.bbc.com/news/election-us-2016-37826098>
- Sullivan, L. (2015, June 3). *In search of the Red Cross’ \$500 million in Haiti relief*. NPR. <https://www.npr.org/2015/06/03/411524156/in-search-of-the-red-cross-500-million-in-haiti-relief>
- Taddeo, L. (2012, January 13). *Exploração Internacional é a causa das dificuldades do Haiti, diz MST*. Opera Mundi. <https://operamundi.uol.com.br/politica-e-economia/19134/exploracao-https://mst.org.br/2012/01/13/brigada-dessalines-exploracao-estrangeira-e-a-causa-das-dificuldades-do-haiti/>
- Terry, F. (2002). *Condemned to repeat: The paradox of humanitarian action*. Cornell University Press.
- UNHCR. (2023). *Humanitarian principles*. <https://emergency.unhcr.org/protection/protection-principles/humanitarian-principles>
- USAID. (2019). *Funding for reconstruction and development activities since the 2010 earthquake*. U.S. Agency for International Development.

- La Via Campesina. (2021). *The International Peasants' Voice* [Brochure]. <https://viacampesina.org/en/international-peasants-voice/>
- Vuzo, S. (2021, July 26). *Tanzania receives first COVID-19 vaccine batch*. United Nations. <https://www.un.org/africarenewal/news/tanzania-receives-first-covid-19-vaccine-batch>
- Wan, W. (2021, August 14). Haiti's long, terrible history of earthquakes and disaster. *The Washington Post*. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/history/2021/08/14/haiti-earthquake-last-one/>
- White, S. (2014). Emerging powers, emerging donors: Teasing out development patterns. In R.E. Grosse & K. E. Meyer (Eds.), *Handbook of Emerging Economies* (pp. 321–338).
- The World Bank. (2010, May 11). *Brazil becomes first country to contribute to Haiti reconstruction fund*. <https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2010/05/11/brazil-first-country-contribute-haiti-reconstruction-fund>
- Yates, C. (2021, September 30). *Haitian migration through the Americas: A decade in the making*. Migration Policy Institute. <https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/haitian-migration-through-americas>